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2 We know that the ancestors of the Dagomba met a people akin to the Kokomba already living in northern Ghana.
- Konkomba
14-15 The traditions of the southern offshoot of Mamprusi, the kingdom of Dagomba . . . do assert that the successful expansion of Dagomba eastwards into Konkomba country in the seventeenth century was due to their use of cavalry. (This is corroborated by the traditions of the Konkomba themselves.)
179 The military value of cavalry was perhaps less evident in confrontations between major states than in the domination of politically fragmented and horseless peoples by centralized kingdoms employing cavalry. The advantage afforded by cavalry is clearly attested, for example, in the case of the conquest of the Konkomba by the cavalry of Dagomba during the seventeenth century. As Konkomba tradition graphically records, 'The Dagomba rose and mounted their horses, that is why we rose up and gave the land to the Dagombas'.(Tait)
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The conquest of eastern Dagomba took place later than that of the west . . . The final settlement of this area may have occurred in the seventeenth century when the capital was moved towards present-day Yendi. The Dagomba pushed back the Konkomba and established divisional chiefs among them. The main towns . . . had the character of outposts, strategically located on the east bank of the River Oti. Despite this assertion of suzerainty, the Dagomba kingdom seems never to have exercised close control over the Konkomba: administration took the form of slave raiding and punitive expeditions. The Konkomba were by no means assimilated. Relations between them and the Dagomba were distant and hostile: there was little, if any, mixing by marriage.
Brukum, N. J. K, The Guinea Fowl, Mango and Pito Wars: Episodes in the History of Northern Ghana, 1980-1999 Ghana Universities Press, Accra, 2001.
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4. . . . the Gonjas under Jakpa defeated Dagbon under Ya Na Dariziogo and compelled the latter to abandon its capital and to move it to its present site, Yendi, which was then a Konkomba town called Chare. The newcomers pushed back the Konkombas and established divisions among them. Despite the assertion of suzerainty, Dagbon seems never to have exercised close control over Konkomba: administration took the form of slave raiding and punitive expeditions.
The Guinea Fowl War (CIDCM)
-
It was the events which are recorded below which set me off on the journey which has led to the publication of AMA and of this web site. MH
Center for International Development and Conflict Management (CIDCM)
http://www.bsos.umd.edu/cidcm/mar/ghamossi.htm
Shin-wha Lee, 3/95
Updates
2/17/96, Anne Pitsch
June 1999, Garth Olcese
Update 2/17/96
1994 February 2: Fighting in the north near the border with Togo broke out between Konkomba and Dagomba ethnic groups. The incident began with a dispute over prices in a market, but quickly accelerated to large-scale violence. The two groups have been at loggerheads for many years because the Konkomba , who are not Ghanaian natives (My emphasis: this is a highly contentious and provocative statement - see the texts above and J. D. Fage - MH) , are denied chieftainship and land. Only 4 of 15 ethnic groups in the region have land ownership.
1994 February 10: The government issued a state of emergency in the northern region (the districts of Yendi, Nanumba, Gushiegu/Karaga, Saboba/Chereponi, East Gonjo, Zabzugu/Tatale and the town of Tamale). About 6000 Konkomba fled to Togo as a result. The government also closed four of its border posts to prevent the conflict from spreading.
1994 March 4: A grenade exploded in Accra in a Konkomba market injuring three. It is thought to be a spillover from the violence in the north between the Konkomba and Dagomba.
1994 March: The government fired on a crowd in Tamale killing 11 and wounding 18. Security forces fired on mainly Dagomba after they had attacked a group of rival Konkomba . It is difficult for the government to reach Konkomba fighters since they operate in small packets under bush cover.
Members of the Dagomba, Gonjas and Namubas (allies) turned in their arms in compliance with a government order to all warring factions.
The seven districts affected by the fighting are the breadbasket of the region and food prices have increased since the fighting broke out in February.
1994 April: An 11 member government delegation held separate talks with leaders of the warring factions in Accra. Both sides agreed to end the conflict and denounce violence as a means of ending their conflict. The three-month old conflict left over 1000 (one report suggested 6000) people dead and 150,000 displaced.
1994 June 9: A peace pact was signed among all warring factions in the north. Two main groups of disputants were involved in the fighting (Konkomba vs. Dagomba, Nanumba and Gonja) as were several smaller groups (Nawuri, Nchumri, Basari). No incidents were reported in the past several weeks, though the region remained tense.
1994 July 8: Parliament agreed to extend the state of emergency imposed on the 7 northern districts for a further month.
1994 August 8: Parliament revoked the state of emergency officially closing the conflict.
1994 October: Police seized arms bound for the north. The Tamale region is tense and the peace agreement signed in April was regarded as a dead letter. Dagomba communities, backed by the Nanumbas and Gonjas, again began buying arms. Many Konkomba have been keeping out of sight following a series of lynchings.
1995 February 16: Bushfires swept across Ghana causing extensive damage to forests and crops. At least 12 were killed.
1995 March: Renewed ethnic fighting in the north left at least 110 dead and 35 wounded. The Konkombas were largely blamed as instigators of the latest violence. The government had the situation under control by the end of the month. In Nanumba District, five arrests were made in connection to the violence. A total of 25 have been arrested since September 1994 in connection to the violence. Latest casualty figures put the number of dead at 2000 since February 1994, and 400 villages and farms have been burnt to the ground.
1995 April: The government began proving funds for the rehabilitation of displaced persons from the ethnic conflict. An estimated 200,000 have been displaced. Most health, education and water facilities were destroyed in the wake of the conflict and most personnel fled the area. Outbreaks of cerebro-spinal meningitis, polio, diphtheria, measles, tetanus and whooping cough were reported. Agriculture in the area is nowhere near its pre-conflict levels.
1995 May 3: Armed forces of Ghana and a detachment of US special forces began a joint military exercise in the northern region.
1995 May 12: Anti-government demonstrations took place in Accra. They were sponsored by the Alliance for Change and they resulted in clashes between pro- and anti-Rawlings demonstrators. Five people were killed in the clashes. (The Alliance for Change may be a mostly Ashanti organization-they were planning a similar demonstration in the Ashanti region.)
1995 June 26: President Rawlings initiated peace talks in parts of the conflict area, praising both sides for their efforts to put aside their differences. Yet, he later issues a warning against the Konkombas in particular to heed reconciliation moves.
1995 June 23: Thousands demonstrate in the sea port of Takoradi in protest over the high cost of living. Ghana has implemented World Bank sponsored austerity measures since the early 1980s and is generally thought to be in healthy financial shape compared to other African states. Yet, per capita income is low (about $450/year) and unemployment is high.
1995 November: Tensions were on the rise between Muslims and non-Muslims in areas of Ghana including in the cities of Sekondi and Kumasi. The tensions between the Dagombas and Konkomba , though essentially over land use, were exacerbated by the fact that Dagombas are mainly Muslims while the Konkomba are mainly animist.
Update June 1999
Risk Assessment
The north of Ghana is not as prosperous as the southern region and many ethnic groups must share the little wealth that does exist there. The Dagombas have traditionally dominated the area while the Konkombas, a stateless people, have survived by working for other ethnic groups on farms.
Violence broke out in 1994 over a minor trade dispute. It exploded into large-scale violence which left at least 1000 and probably 2000 people dead, 150,000 displaced, and several hundred villages and farms destroyed. Tensions eased in 1995, though the underlying causes of the dispute--access to land and local political representation--remain.
Groups other than the Konkomba and Dagomba were involved in the dispute, but their status in the region is unclear. The Mossi did not appear to be involved at all. Though the north is less prosperous than the south, the dispute was not really about this inequality.
The Rawlings government appeared to handle the conflict effectively, and abuses by the armed forces were rarely reported. His government made several attempts at peace and reconciliation and as of the end of 1995, the conflict was well under control if not fully resolved. Rawlings urged the combatants to work for the prosperity of the region and country and tried to convince them that internal conflict would only cause larger problems in the long run.
Fighting between the Konkomba people and Nchumurus almost broke out in 1997 over land disputes. Luckily President Rawlings was able to quell the situation before it got out of hand. Although large scale violence was avoided the Northern region of Ghana was still hit with terrible outbreaks of spinal meningitis and guineaworm after health workers who feared an outbreak of violence fled the region.
People in the north of the country remain at risk from the possibility of renewed fighting and from the results of the disruptions in agriculture and services caused by the conflict. Hunger and disease were reported after the conflict as late as September 1995, though the process of restoring services has begun.
The conflict requires close scrutiny and if it erupts again in 1999, it is likely the Konkomba will qualify as a new group at risk.
Emmy
Toonen: Ghana: Mediating
a Way out of Complex Ethnic Conflicts
Ethnic conflict in northern Ghana has roots which reach back to the colonial period. Heightened tensions during the early 1990s led to the outbreak of civil war in 1994 which continued to 1995. The conflict was largely unnoticed by regional and supra-national organisations, and it was the Ghanaian Government together with domestic and international NGOs who took responsibility for resolving the conflict. Their efforts proved successful and a relative peace has returned to the area, although it is considered fragile by many. As a result of their experiences, conflict prevention has become a core activity of many of the local and international organisations working in northern Ghana*.
By Emmy Toonen
Society in the northern part of Ghana is divided along traditional hierarchic and ethnic lines in which the tribe and the chiefs play an important role in day-to-day rural life. It is mainly the chiefs who act as the spokesmen of the various ethnic groups and who participate in local and national government. There are, however, also elected local and national politicians and youth association spokespersons are also very powerful.
* Several parts of this survey are based on the Oxfam-report `Building Sustainable Peace: Conflict, Conciliation and Civil Society in Northern Ghana´.
People from northern Ghana, especially the rural population, identify strongly with their ethnic groups and traditions. The national government in Accra on the south coast is often regarded as very remote and of lesser importance. The distinction is reinforced by the disadvantaged economic position of the north in comparison to the rest of the country. It is difficult to say how far this division has played a role in the genesis of the conflict and, later, in the national conciliation attempts. However, it is certain that the remoteness of some conflict areas and the lack of infrastructure and communication technology has sometimes made communication between the various parties and government mediators difficult.
The roots of the conflicts in northern Ghana are complex and interwoven. Moreover accounts of the origins of conflicts vary among the different ethnic groups. The major points of contention, however, lie in disputes over land rights and political representation. Land rights are ultimately vested in the paramount chief on behalf of the ethnic group. Members of other ethnic groups who live on the land of a chief are expected to live by his or her rules and to show respect or allegiance, sometimes in the form of gifts.
Since British colonial rule, paramount chieftaincy has also been the prerequisite for a seat in the Northern and National Houses of Chiefs, and thus for significant political representation. However, only four ethnic groups, the Dagomba, Nanumba, Gonja and Mamprusi, have paramount chiefs. The other ethnic groups, such as the Konkomba , Nchumuru and Nawuri, have always been `headless´, or acephalous. The Konkomba for example, originally came from Togo and migrated to Ghana in the early twentieth century. ( My emphasis - David Tait tells a completely different story. So does J. D.Fage MH) They are generally farmers and often move from one geographical area to another in search of fertile land. Instead of a system of paramount chieftaincy, where the community is governed by several chiefs and headed by a paramount chief, they have a non-centralised political system without secular leaders.
Nevertheless, the Konkomba and other acephalous groups have long claimed they should be entitled to the same political rights as paramount chieftaincy groups. To them, the current system is the unacceptable result of ancient rules. Since all the land belongs to chiefs, Konkomba are forced to live on `foreign´ land. Their refusal to respect the foreign chief´s rule has often led to disputes. In reality, the Konkomba are not completely without political and economic representation. However, a legal recognition of their equal status would enable them to become more involved in local and national government. It would also enable them to gain access to district assembly funds which the government is currently creating to support a decentralisation programme.
Because they form a relatively large part of the population in northern Ghana, the Konkomba feel fully justified in pursuing this claim. According to 1996 figures of Minorities at Risk, the Konkomba , with 300,000 to 400,000 people, are the second largest ethnic group in the Northern Region and consequently they feel that they have the right to exercise authority over their own land. However, the land issue is particularly thorny. Fertile lands, which were once sufficient for all, are becoming increasingly scarce and thus increasingly valuable. The owners of fertile land are unwilling to surrender any part of their claim to ownership, particularly as they have the backing of the law.
The conflict over land and political power was a major source of tension among different ethnic groups but the conflict in the region also has other roots. Historically, many of the region´s groups have had a good understanding with each other. In some cases, coexistence and intermarriage are common, making it difficult, on occasion, to define which ethnic group someone actually belongs.
However, mutual incomprehension and ridicule, often based on rumours, played an important role in the build up of hostility before and during the conflicts. Rumours of the alleged bellicosity and malign intentions of the other parties were widespread and were frequently fuelled by media reports. In one striking example, the Ghanaian Chronicle of January 31, 1993, contained an article predicting a terrible bloodbath in the near future, which would leave as many as 10,000 people dead. This caused such a great disturbance that in the city of Tamale, loudspeaker vans had to be used to calm down the distressed citizens.
Religious differences have also been identified as a source of division, especially over the last ten years. In general terms, Christian missionary activity has been most successful among the acephalous groups, while Islam has had a stronger influence on the chieftaincy groups. However, the Islamic influence is mainly seen among the leading families. The traditional religions still have the largest numbers of followers. At the village level, many people practice an eclectic mix of religion so religious differences are rarely a cause for conflict.
Finally, the situation is further complicated by the fact that conflicts not only occur between the various groups but also within them. Conflicts between the older and more traditional generation of rulers and the younger group members with more modern views on government, sometimes cause divisions within an ethnic group. These internal divisions surface in disagreements on how to solve the problems the group faces, and can subsequently hamper the peace process.
Conflict Dynamics
The 1994-1995 civil war is usually said to have started on January 31, 1994, following a quarrel between Konkomba and Nanumba over the price of a guinea fowl at a market in Nakpayili near Bimbilla. The war is therefore also known as the "Guinea Fowl War".
Relations between the different ethnic groups had been tense all through 1993. Earlier conflicts in the region had never been resolved and there was fear of new attacks. Also, there were a growing number of rumours about Konkomba plans to seize land. From July 1993, these rumours turned into clear mistrust when Konkomba leaders sent a petition to the National House of Chiefs. In this petition, they claimed that, as they were the second largest group in the Northern Region, their most important leader, the `chief´ of Saboba, should have the same status as a paramount chief.
After the incident at Nakpayili - accounts of which vary considerably - fighting broke out between Konkomba and Nanumba and spread rapidly. On February 10, after ten days of fighting the government declared a state of emergency in the town of Tamale and several other districts. A joint Military Task Force was set up. Fighting continued for months with disastrous effect. The numbers of dead and displaced are still uncertain, however, several observers suggest that there were 2,000 deaths in 1994 alone, that 322 villages were devastated and some 178,000 people were displaced. Farms, herds and produce were destroyed, and the economy severely damaged. Social life in general as well as the interaction between the various ethnic groups was also badly affected, as were medical and educational facilities in the region.
In April 1994 a government delegation held talks with leaders of the warring factions in the capital Accra. Both sides agreed to end the conflict and the violence. On June 9, after a number of quiet, but tense, weeks, a peace treaty was signed. However, it was not until August 8 that parliament revoked the state of emergency, thereby officially ending the conflict.
Although the tensions had diminished, their causes still remained unresolved and in March and May 1995 there were renewed outbreaks of violence. This time, at least 110 people were killed. Health conditions also deteriorated due to a lack of food and clean water. Subsequently, in November, the friction between Konkombas and Dagombas was given a new, religious dimension. As tensions between Muslims and non-Muslims increased in different parts of Ghana, the relationship between the mainly Muslim Dagomba and the mainly animist Konkomba also worsened.
At the end of 1995, the situation in the conflict area grew calmer, which is widely ascribed to mediation attempts and peace talks involving all warring parties. Agreements were made to change the old structure of political representation and land rights. Consequently, the main points of contention seemed to have been tackled. By the end of 1998, the overall situation in the region looked positive. However, problems remain in the (re)building of the area´s economy and infrastructure. Moreover, the area was hit by a serious food shortage in 1997. The city of Tamale is now calm but the Konkombas are still too afraid to enter the city for fear of reprisals. Isolated incidents are now and then reported in the Ghanaian press. In May 1999, for example, members of the Konkomba Youth Association in Yendi warned of the threat to peace in the region, following what they claimed as police inaction to attacks on Konkombas .
Official Conflict Management
The northern Ghana conflict, being an internal and local conflict, has received little attention from large intergovernmental organisations. Consequently, official conflict management initiatives have originated mainly from within the Ghanaian government. These domestic attempts were begun in mid-1993, when a delegation of government officials twice visited the area to act as mediators. However, the situation was worsened by rumours and misunderstandings and proved difficult to resolve.
The army is generally regarded as having played an important role in the process of appeasement although its late response has often been criticised. Surprisingly, the army was very constructive in restoring the peace based on a balanced and thorough analysis of the situation. The Task Force dispatched to the conflict area helped NGOs with relief distribution. Other direct government action consisted of an agricultural relief package. However, the government found donor funding difficult to obtain. Ministerial visits to donor headquarters in Europe were unsuccessful as donors preferred to use NGOs as relief activity channels. This is said to have caused tension between the government and NGOs.
In order to negotiate peace, a Permanent Peace Negotiation Committee was set up in April 1994 to talk with the various parties involved. The meetings, some of which were set up together with the NGO Consortium discussed below, led to a Peace Treaty on June 9, 1994. At that time, however, the conflicts had yet to be resolved. Negotiation continued and finally two reconciliation ceremonies, both in the presence of President Rawlings, were held in December 1995 and in May 1996. At this stage, a lasting peace seemed to be much more certain.
Multi-Track Diplomacy
With their many different activities, NGOs have played an important role in resolving this conflict. Initially, they focused mainly on relief for the many people who were displaced or had otherwise been affected by the war. As the conflict continued, some NGOs also took up an important role as mediators. Today, their work continues, and often includes conflict prevention activities.
Before the outbreak of the 1994 conflict, several NGOs had already become firmly established in the Northern Region of Ghana. These were mainly social development organisations, both local and international. At the beginning of the conflict, there was hardly any cooperation between the different organisations. Assessment missions were held by several NGOs simultaneously and the first relief aid was donated directly to the various NGOs by their international donors. About a month after the outbreak of the conflict, the first Red Cross relief aid arrived and after two months the government and the various NGO-missions were able to focus on needs assessments.
As the conflict continued, however, the need for more cooperation became apparent. An informal NGO network, the Inter-NGO Consortium, was formed. Participants were a mixture of local NGOs, such as Action Aid Ghana, Action on Disability and Development, Amaschina, Assemblies of God Development and Relief Services, Catholic Relief Services, Catholic Secretariat, Council of Churches, Business Advisory Development and Consultancy Centre, Gubkatimali and Penorudas, and international NGOs such as Lifeline Denmark, Oxfam, Red Cross and World Vision. In joining forces, they hoped to obtain and distribute humanitarian aid more efficiently. The independence of the various organisations was kept intact, so that each of them bore the responsibilities for their own projects.
After the first humanitarian aid had arrived, the Consortium also started to focus on conflict transformation and reconciliation initiatives. This was mainly done in cooperation with the Nairobi Peace Initiative (NPI), an NGO which, since its foundation in 1984, has built up a lot of mediation experience in several conflicts in Africa. Needs assessment and field visits were started at the end of 1994. The NPI also participated in the Consortium´s Peace Awareness Campaign. An important part of this campaign was the setting up of a series of workshops, the Kumasi workshops, in which the various parties involved in the conflict were to be brought together. The NPI and Consortium staff organised the first two Kumasi workshops in May and June 1995. Participants in these workshops included members from all ethnic groups involved, several chiefs, opinion leaders and NGO staff. In the first two workshops all parties assessed the damage the war had caused. The statements of the different parties were also heard and discussed.
Instrumental in this effort was Hizkias Assefa who based his efforts on a new philosophy `Peace and Reconciliation as a Paradigm´ which is described as a philosophy of peace and its implications for conflict, governance and economic growth in Africa. It attempts to look at the crisis with the hope of providing pointers on how to begin to change behaviour and situations. The paradigm identifies approaches to be utilised in bringing about desired changes. The paradigm also suggests roles for actors leading to the kinds of changes and transformation necessary.
A first step towards reconciliation was made when all parties admitted that mutual hostility should, for the benefit of all, make way for a mutual effort to create a lasting peace. The leaders of the ethnic groups agreed to spread these ideas to their communities so as to indirectly involve them in the peace process. However, no official agreements had been made at these first workshops. Hostility and mistrust were said to have lessened after these first two workshops, at least at the administrator´s level. At village level, however, it was still clearly present. Field visits and meetings with the parties involved continued between the Kumasi Workshops, and in December 1995, a third workshop took place. Once again, all statements were heard. This time, attention was also given to the participant´s ideas on how to solve the disputes.
The fourth Kumasi Workshop, in February 1996, concentrated on the composition of a draft version of a Peace Accord. This procedure was the result of more extensive talks held between the NPI and leaders of the ethnic groups, both separately and jointly. In the fifth Workshop, in March 1996, the draft version was officially signed. The main achievement of this Peace Accord was the fact that the acephalous Konkomba were to become a Paramount Chieftaincy group. Also, initiatives to establish peace awareness activities within the various communities were formulated.
Over the period in which the Kumasi Workshops were held, further peace initiatives were launched by the Consortium in cooperation with civil society representatives. Another part of the Peace Awareness Campaign, for example, was the setting up of a Peace and Reconciliation Working Group (PRWG). This working group consisted of NGO staff and was established to set up, facilitate and evaluate different reconciliation activities. Another initiative was the Peace Education Campaign (PEC). This campaign was aimed at the community level. It involved leaders of the different ethnic groups travelling from one community to the next, acting as peace builders in engaging people directly in the peace process and encouraging them to support it.
In response to a request by a number of local organisations, the UK-based Conciliation Resources has formed a team to consult with Ghanaians affected by inter-communal violence to provide an assessment of the conflict and possible constructive responses.
Local organisations
Apart from the peace initiatives taken by the Consortium as a whole, several other, usually local, projects were organised by individual NGOs. These initiatives included, for example, Action Aid Ghana´s support in the rebuilding of a school by both Konkomba and Dagomba communities. The Council of Churches, among others, focused on the coexistence of Muslim and Christian communities by organising mixed prayer sessions and other meetings. Several organisations have set up non-violence workshops, fact-finding missions and peace education programmes for teachers and community leaders. Thus, now that the actual conflict has ended, conflict prevention has become a major concern for a large number of NGOs.
In addition to official domestic and NGO initiatives, another important conflict prevention initiative has come from one of Ghanaian traditional social groups. This is the Northern Youth and Development Association (NORYDA). Youth Associations have a long tradition in northern Ghana. They are ethnically or regionally based and are formed by politically active `opinion leaders´. Though their name suggests otherwise, age does not play a role in the Youth Organisations´ membership. As a body of politically engaged people, Youth Organisations often function as representatives of their community at the national level. With the creation of NORYDA, at the suggestion of the Youth Organisations themselves, this existing model is to be used as a deliberative body on the prevention of new conflicts.
Evaluation
Of the various peace initiatives described above, the organisation and involvement of the Consortium is generally seen as the most influential. It has continued its work after the peace process, changing its main activities from relief, to mediation, to conflict prevention. According to the various NGOs involved, this informal cooperative network has certainly proved useful in times of conflict and humanitarian need. It has enabled the participating organisations to pool their resources and expertise and to cover the widest possible area.
However, this loose structure seems to have had less effect on peace awareness projects set up in the aftermath of the conflict. Here there were frequent complaints about a lack of commitment and means. This is seen as the main reason why larger, coordinated conflict transformation and prevention activities have been difficult to get off the ground and to maintain over a longer period of time. At the end of 1998, the activities of the Consortium and NPI have clearly decreased. Those of the Peace and Reconciliation Working Group have ceased altogether. The small, individual projects of the various NGOs, on the other hand, are reported to be meeting with success. As they are usually local projects, carried out in areas where the NGOs in question had already established themselves, they are having a direct impact in their different communities.
Finally, the future of the NORYDA organisation is generally regarded as positive. Although it faces some problems regarding the unconditional, unbiased and a-political cooperation of the various ethnic groups involved, this same ethnic diversity is also its main source of success. In contrast to the competition that existed between the various ethnic youth organisations before its creation, NORYDA tries to deal with the interests of the various ethnic groups as a whole. The development of NORYDA is currently being supported by the Consortium and various individual NGOs.
Prospects
In general, the situation since 1995 has been calm. Repatriation and rebuilding activities continue. The government claims to be keeping any possible sources of violence well under control. President Rawlings has stressed on various occasions that violence will not be tolerated and that the government will suppress, with army intervention if necessary, any outbreaks of violence. This policy seems to have had its effect.
Also, the Kumasi Accord seems to have tackled the most direct causes of conflict in admitting the paramount chieftaincy rights for the Konkomba . However, this issue has formed the basis for a new dispute, and possibly for a new conflict. Chieftaincy groups have proposed the appointment of three paramount chiefs for the large group of Konkombas . The Konkombas , however, prefer to have only one. They fear that the proposal for three paramount chiefs is part of a divide and rule strategy of the chieftaincy groups. Peace in the region is always fragile as, with so many different ethnic groups and interests, new conflicts on related issues are always likely to flare up. So too, the general economic situation, which is still feeling the effects of the war and of the droughts, could play an important role in creating new tensions.
Recommendations
The conflict has eased, but some potential causes of future conflict remain. As international fora and separate NGOs have made little study of the situation in northern Ghana, apart from donor policies, hardly any policy and action recommendations have been formulated. The effects of the various peace initiatives, which until now have seemed very positive, will have to prove their value in the long run.
Feedback please to Monique Mekenkamp <mailto:m.mekenkamp@euconflict.org>
Monique Mekenkamp, project coordinator
European Centre for Conflict Prevention
P.O. Box 14069
3508 SC Utrecht
the Netherlands
tel: +31-30-253 75 28
fax: +31-30-253 7529
Reports
Oxfam
The Peace Process in Northern Ghana, by Ada van der Linde & Rachel Naylor. Draft report 1996, will be published in June/July 1999 as part of the series Building Sustainable Peace.
Other publications
Der Bürgerkrieg in Nordghana 1994, Artur Bogner. In: Afrika Spektrum 31 (1996)
Resource Contacts
Kwesi Aaku - Mediation & Change, Ghana
Charles Abbey - Executive Director African Development Programme, Ghana
Hizkias Asefa - Nairobi Peace Initiative, Kenya
Judith Burdin Asuni - director Academic Associates Peace Works, Nigeria
Seibik-Bugri Jackson - director Partners for Democratic Change, Ghana
Rachel Naylor & Ada van der Linde - Oxfam UK
Isaac Richard Osei - Action Aid Ghana
Selected Internet Sites
www.icrc.ch/unicc/icrcnews.nsf (ICRC)
www.bsos.umd.edu/cidcm (Center for International Development and Conflict Management/Minorities at Risk Programme)
www.ug.edu.gh/ (University of Ghana)
www.ghanareview.co.uk/ (Ghana Review International)
www.africaonline.com.gh (AfricaOnline)
Addresses (additional to the ones given in the 1998 Directory)
African Development Programme
P.O. Box 3424
Accra
GHANA
Tel: +233-21-306345
Fax: +233-21-662035
Partners for Democratic Change
P.O. Box 1211
Madina Accra
GHANA
Tel: +233-21-231021
Fax: +233-21-501279
- * Emmy Toonen is in the last year of her studies of International
Relations at the University of Utrecht, where she is majoring in Human
Rights. She has worked as an intern at the European Centre for Conflict
Prevention.
European Platform for Conflict Prevention and Transformation
Searching for Peace in Africa
Ghana: Mediating a Way out of Complex Ethnic Conflicts http://www.oneworld.org/euconflict/sfp/part2/291.htm
- The
follow text has been extracted from a page on the Georgia State
University web site. The URL is http://www-pals.gsu.edu/~finjws/conflict.htm
The writer, not identified there, is Prof. George Ayittey - Conflict Resolution in
Traditional Africa 1 Feb 99
In much of Africa, these structures (for the peaceful resolution of disputes) are woefully lacking. Thus, a trivial political dispute can easily escalate into a full-blown civil war that sends refugees streaming in all directions. A typical example was the February 1994 deadly ethnic conflict in northern Ghana between the Konkomba, the Nanumba, the Dagomba, and the Gonja, which claimed over 2,000 lives. The conflict was started by a simple dispute over the price of a fowl. This dispute flared up into a general conflict because there was no local institution for resolving disputes.
Tension had long been simmering among the ethnic groups. At issue was the Konkomba claim to paramountcy and a traditional council. They contended that they had their own land, their own political district, and their own culture and language. Their "land" comprised the entire Oti Basin, stretching from the northern tip of the Northern Region to the northern part of the Volta Region, which they claimed to have inhabited as far back as the seventeenth century. As such, they claimed to be entitled to a paramountcy to be sited at Saboba.
According to the Ya-Na, king of the Dagbon, "the Konkombas do not own any land in Dagbon. Rather they cohabit on Dagbon land with Dagbamba and will never be given the land they were seeking." "I can assure you that much as I am resolved never to cede a square inch of of Dagbon land, I am equally determined that all persons on Dagbon land should enjoy the protection of the law and should be free to pursue their legitimate business unhindered by any person or authority" (Ghana Drum, April 1994, 21).
Since the dispute could not be solved at the local level, the case had to be referred to Accra, the seat of government. But it took time to get the facts of the case to Accra. Even then, Accra was notoriously slow in responding. It might send government delegations or promise a commission of inquiry while people were being killed. Worse, Accra took sides in the dispute.
As many as 18 National Democratic Congress members of parliament from the Northern Region sided with the Nanumba-Dagbon. Most reprehensible were allegations by Dr. Mohammed Ibn Chambas, MP for Bimbilla in the Nanumba District, that the Konkombas started the violence, with the backing of the government of Togo. An NDC minister without portfolio added fuel to the fire by calling upon the government to "teach the Konkombas a lesson they deserve." In cases such as this, African governments fail to act with scrupulous neutrality and thereby aggravate the conflict.